INSURANCE LAW BLOG

Between the Lines


 

A Substance Emitted Pursuant to a Discharge Permit May Still Be Excluded “Pollution”

by Charles J. Fischette
March 3, 2026

Few coverage issues have received more attention than the interpretation of various iterations of the pollution exclusion to a general liability policy.  In Griffin Foods International, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2026 IL 131710, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether a substance is a “pollutant” even when it is emitted pursuant to a valid permit.

Griffin Foods and its successor were defendants in a mass tort case alleging that the release of ethylene oxide (“EtO”) from their medical-equipment sterilization facility for over thirty-five years caused nearby residents to develop cancer and other diseases.  National Union, the defendants’ insurer during two of those years, refused to defend, citing the pollution exclusions, which barred coverage for “‘bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water.’”  Id. ¶ 6.  The federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois sided with Griffin Foods, holding that the exclusion did not apply because the releases were subject to a permit issued by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”).  Id. ¶ 7.  In reaching its holding, the district court relied in part on Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp., 2011 IL App (3d) 100380.  In that case the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous as to whether it applied to emissions covered by an IEPA permit.

In Griffin Foods, on a certified question from the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with Imperial Marble and held that whether a party holds a permit is irrelevant to the determination of whether a substance falls within the pollution exclusion, stating:

“The fact that the IEPA permitted the EtO emissions does not change th[e] analysis. . . .  [T]he IEPA permit did not change the character or substance of the EtO emissions as pollution.  Indeed, if the EtO emissions were not pollution, there would have been no need for the policyholders to obtain a permit from IEPA in the first place.  In other words, the permit allowing the policyholders to emit EtO did not, in some manner, render those emissions no longer pollution in the plain and ordinarily understood meaning of the word. . . .  In sum, in determining whether the pollution exclusion in a CGL policy applies, we hold that it is irrelevant whether the underlying pollution is permitted or not.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 29.

Nonetheless, the Court did not retreat from its prior holding that, because the pollution exclusion has “‘potentially limitless application,’” it must be interpreted in light of the intent of the parties and therefore only applies to “hazards traditionally associated with environmental pollution.”  Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 493 (1998)) (accidental release of carbon monoxide due to broken furnace did not constitute environmental pollution within exclusion).

Griffin Foods suggests two potentially useful inquiries in evaluating whether the pollution exclusion applies: (1) is the substance a “pollutant” as traditionally understood; and (2) was the pollutant released in a manner typical of traditional pollution liabilities?  If both are answered “yes,” the pollution exclusion likely applies.  Whether the release was permitted or not does not change the “character or substance of the . . . emissions as pollution.”  Id. ¶ 26.

A potential test case for this approach is exposure to microplastics.  Are microplastics “traditional” pollutants within the intent of the exclusion?  Were they released in the same way as “traditional” pollutants?  Policyholders have arguments available and should not accept the analysis that bodily injury or property damage arising out of any type of exposure to any harmful substance is excluded as “pollution.”